This document describes how to set up TLS client certificate bootstrapping for kubelets. Kubernetes 1.4 introduced an API for requesting certificates from a cluster-level Certificate Authority (CA). The original intent of this API is to enable provisioning of TLS client certificates for kubelets. The proposal can be found here and progress on the feature is being tracked as feature #43.
The API server should be configured with an authenticator that can authenticate tokens as a user in the system:bootstrappers
group.
This group will later be used in the controller-manager configuration to scope approvals in the default approval controller. As this feature matures, you should ensure tokens are bound to a Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) policy which limits requests (using the bootstrap token) strictly to client requests related to certificate provisioning. With RBAC in place, scoping the tokens to a group allows for great flexibility (e.g. you could disable a particular bootstrap group’s access when you are done provisioning the nodes).
While any authentication strategy can be used for the kubelet’s initial bootstrap credentials, the following two authenticators are recommended for ease of provisioning.
Using bootstrap tokens is currently alpha and will simplify the management of bootstrap token management especially in a HA scenario.
Tokens are arbitrary but should represent at least 128 bits of entropy derived from a secure random number generator (such as /dev/urandom on most modern systems). There are multiple ways you can generate a token. For example:
head -c 16 /dev/urandom | od -An -t x | tr -d ' '
will generate tokens that look like 02b50b05283e98dd0fd71db496ef01e8
The token file should look like the following example, where the first three values can be anything and the quoted group name should be as depicted:
02b50b05283e98dd0fd71db496ef01e8,kubelet-bootstrap,10001,"system:bootstrappers"
Add the --token-auth-file=FILENAME
flag to the kube-apiserver command (in your systemd unit file perhaps) to enable the token file.
See docs here for further details.
Add the --client-ca-file=FILENAME
flag to the kube-apiserver command to enable client certificate authentication,
referencing a certificate authority bundle containing the signing certificate (e.g. --client-ca-file=/var/lib/kubernetes/ca.pem
).
The API for requesting certificates adds a certificate-issuing control loop to the Kubernetes Controller Manager. This takes the form of a cfssl local signer using assets on disk. Currently, all certificates issued have one year validity and a default set of key usages.
You must provide a Certificate Authority in order to provide the cryptographic materials necessary to issue certificates.
This CA should be trusted by kube-apiserver for authentication with the --client-ca-file=FILENAME
flag. The management
of the CA is beyond the scope of this document but it is recommended that you generate a dedicated CA for Kubernetes.
Both certificate and key are assumed to be PEM-encoded.
The kube-controller-manager flags are:
--cluster-signing-cert-file="/etc/path/to/kubernetes/ca/ca.crt" --cluster-signing-key-file="/etc/path/to/kubernetes/ca/ca.key"
In 1.7 the experimental “group auto approver” controller is dropped in favor of the new csrapproving
controller
that ships as part of kube-controller-manager and is enabled by default.
The controller uses the SubjectAccessReview
API to determine
if a given user is authorized to request a CSR, then approves based on the authorization outcome. To prevent
conflicts with other approvers, the builtin approver doesn’t explicitly deny CSRs, only ignoring unauthorized requests.
The controller categorizes CSRs into three subresources:
nodeclient
- a request by a user for a client certificate with O=system:nodes
and CN=system:node:(node name)
.selfnodeclient
- a node renewing a client certificate with the same O
and CN
.selfnodeserver
- a node renewing a serving certificate. (ALPHA, requires feature gate)The checks to determine if a CSR is a selfnodeserver
request is currently tied to the kubelet’s credential rotation
implementation, an alpha feature. As such, the definition of selfnodeserver
will likely change in a future and
requires the RotateKubeletServerCertificate
feature gate on the controller manager. The feature progress can be
tracked at kubernetes/features#267.
--feature-gates=RotateKubeletServerCertificate=true
The following RBAC ClusterRoles
represent the nodeclient
, selfnodeclient
, and selfnodeserver
capabilities. Similar roles
may be automatically created in future releases.
# A ClusterRole which instructs the CSR approver to approve a user requesting
# node client credentials.
kind: ClusterRole
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1beta1
metadata:
name: approve-node-client-csr
rules:
- apiGroups: ["certificates.k8s.io"]
resources: ["certificatesigningrequests/nodeclient"]
verbs: ["create"]
---
# A ClusterRole which instructs the CSR approver to approve a node renewing its
# own client credentials.
kind: ClusterRole
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1beta1
metadata:
name: approve-node-client-renewal-csr
rules:
- apiGroups: ["certificates.k8s.io"]
resources: ["certificatesigningrequests/selfnodeclient"]
verbs: ["create"]
---
# A ClusterRole which instructs the CSR approver to approve a node requesting a
# serving cert matching its client cert.
kind: ClusterRole
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1beta1
metadata:
name: approve-node-server-renewal-csr
rules:
- apiGroups: ["certificates.k8s.io"]
resources: ["certificatesigningrequests/selfnodeserver"]
verbs: ["create"]
These powers can be granted to credentials, such as bootstrapping tokens. For example, to replicate the behavior provided by the removed auto-approval flag, of approving all CSRs by a single group:
# REMOVED: This flag no longer works as of 1.7.
--insecure-experimental-approve-all-kubelet-csrs-for-group="system:bootstrappers"
An admin would create a ClusterRoleBinding
targeting that group.
# Approve all CSRs for the group "system:bootstrappers"
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1beta1
metadata:
name: auto-approve-csrs-for-group
subjects:
- kind: Group
name: system:bootstrappers
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
roleRef:
kind: ClusterRole
name: approve-node-client-csr
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
To let a node renew its own credentials, an admin can construct a ClusterRoleBinding
targeting
that node’s credentials:
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1beta1
metadata:
name: node1-client-cert-renewal
subjects:
- kind: User
name: system:node:node-1 # Let "node-1" renew its client certificate.
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
roleRef:
kind: ClusterRole
name: approve-node-client-renewal-csr
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
Deleting the binding will prevent the node from renewing its client credentials, effectively removing it from the cluster once its certificate expires.
To request a client certificate from kube-apiserver, the kubelet first needs a path to a kubeconfig file that contains the
bootstrap authentication token. You can use kubectl config set-cluster
, set-credentials
, and set-context
to build this kubeconfig. Provide the name kubelet-bootstrap
to kubectl config set-credentials
and include --token=<token-value>
as follows:
kubectl config set-credentials kubelet-bootstrap --token=${BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN} --kubeconfig=bootstrap.kubeconfig
When starting the kubelet, if the file specified by --kubeconfig
does not exist, the bootstrap kubeconfig is used to request a client certificate from the API server. On approval of the certificate request and receipt back by the kubelet, a kubeconfig file referencing the generated key and obtained certificate is written to the path specified by --kubeconfig
. The certificate and key file will be placed in the directory specified by --cert-dir
.
Note: The following flags are required to enable this bootstrapping when starting the kubelet:
--require-kubeconfig
--bootstrap-kubeconfig="/path/to/bootstrap/kubeconfig"
Additionally, in 1.7 the kubelet implements alpha features for enabling rotation of both its client and/or serving certs.
These can be enabled through the respective RotateKubeletClientCertificate
and RotateKubeletServerCertificate
feature
flags on the kubelet, but may change in backward incompatible ways in future releases.
--feature-gates=RotateKubeletClientCertificate=true,RotateKubeletServerCertificate=true
RotateKubeletClientCertificate
causes the kubelet to rotate its client certificates by creating new CSRs as its existing
credentials expire. RotateKubeletServerCertificate
causes the kubelet to both request a serving certificate after
bootstrapping its client credentials and rotate the certificate. The serving cert currently does not request DNS or IP
SANs.
The signing controller does not immediately sign all certificate requests. Instead, it waits until they have been flagged with an
“Approved” status by an appropriately-privileged user. This is intended to eventually be an automated process handled by an external
approval controller, but for the alpha version of the API it can be done manually by a cluster administrator using kubectl.
An administrator can list CSRs with kubectl get csr
and describe one in detail with kubectl describe csr <name>
. Before the 1.6 release there were
no direct approve/deny commands so an approver had to update
the Status field directly (rough how-to). Later versions of Kubernetes offer kubectl certificate approve <name>
and kubectl certificate deny <name>
commands.